The purpose of this study was to analyse the hedging behaviour of 98 citrus growers from the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Marketing behaviour was modelled as a choice between spot market, short and long-term forward contracts. A multinomial logistic regression model was used to evaluate the role of behavioural, personal and managerial variables in the choice. Results indicated that the factors which explain the use of forward contracts by citrus growers are the following: risk propensity; trade with juice processing companies; farming diversification; overconfidence in management; participation in pools; use of management tools; and technical assistance. The results can be useful for farmers, policymakers, government agencies, traders and extension agents.
Introduction
Farmers usually face different types of risk simultaneously, and five major sources of risk can be distinguished: production, price, financial/credit, institutional and operational (OECD 2009 ). The focus of this paper is on price risk, which can be mitigated through derivative contracts such as forward contracts, futures contracts, options and swaps. Several factors determine the adoption of derivative contracts by farmers. Previous studies point to four groups of factors: farmers' characteristics (such as age, level of education and experience); farmers' behavioural attitudes (such as risk perception, risk aversion and overconfidence); the specific characteristics of each farm (such as product category, location, leverage and production size) and farmers' preferences regarding risk management tools. Producers can additionally adopt other strategies such as farming diversification, off-farm income, vertical integration, diversification of distribution channels and government programs (Pennings and Leuthold 2000; Velandia et al. 2009 ).
Price risk is especially pervasive in the citrus industry. In general, a citrus grove has a lifespan of about 20 years. Orange, for instance, is a perennial crop culture with medium-/long-term results. Orange growers face high initial costs to establish the orchard in the first 3 years and zero crop revenue during the same period. Revenues start in the third year, but yield is still very low. Crop yield increases in the following years and decreases in the final ones. Growers may continue their operations even when prices are below unit production cost for a couple of years, as long as they maintain expectations of recovery in the years to come. This attitude may result in indebtedness and gradual capital loss if their positive expectations are not met. For this reason, short-and long-term forward contracts are usually adopted by citrus growers to mitigate price risk.
In the case of the Brazilian citrus market, short-term forward contracts are the standard contracts offered by juice processing companies. They are negotiated a few months before harvest and are related to annual production. In general, these contracts have some standard clauses, allowing for price differentiation according to volume, fruit quality and the period in the season. Long-term forward contracts are associated with two or more succeeding seasons. In this case, the selling price is formed by a standard minimum price and an additional premium which depends on ICE orange juice future prices. The minimum price and the premium are subject to negotiation between orange growers and processing firms. Price differentiation depends mainly on volume, fruit quality and the period in the season. Both contracts have a fixed price (minimum price) to be paid at a fixed date in the future. Usually, longterm forward contracts present more terms and rules than short-term forward ones.
Despite the number of studies examining the factors that affect producers' marketing choices, no study has comprehensively explored how these factors influence citrus growers' hedging decisions. The objective of this paper was to evaluate hedging strategies adopted by citrus growers, identifying the factors that influence their choices of risk management tools. Two theoretical perspectives -risk management and transaction costs -are adopted in the analysis. A multinomial logistic regression model is used to test the hypotheses.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next subsection contains a literature review on the factors (farmer/farm characteristics) influencing the adoption of risk management strategies. Subsequently, the research method is described, followed by the empirical results and the conclusions.
Previous studies
Many empirical studies have analysed factors influencing the risk management strategies employed by farmers in general. Most of them have focused on U.S. markets and made use of qualitative choice models. Table 1 provides Pace and Robinson (2012) found that farmers' education, planted area size, off-farm activities, participation in cooperatives, beliefs about the price in pre-harvest periods, beliefs in the performance of merchant pools and the willingness to take lower prices to reduce price risk affected cotton farmers' marketing decisions. Focusing on Illinois cotton farmers, Tudor et al. (2014) pointed out that farmer's age and gross farm income were the main predictors of the risk management strategy to be chosen. In addition, Wolf (2012) investigated the use of price risk management tools by U.S. dairy farmers. The results showed that herd size, farmland operated, age and farm organisation played an important role in the making of hedging decisions.
Recent studies have also explored the factors that influence farmers' strategies in different countries. Mattos and Fryza (2012) Considering hedging decisions among German farmers, Anastassiadis et al. (2014) showed that price expectations, attitude regarding risk and storage capacity influenced the risk management strategies of grain farmers.
Jordaan and Grov e (2007) evaluated marketing strategies among maize producers in South Africa. The authors indicated that human capital and risk aversion affected farmers' decision-making process. In Brazil, Carrer et al. (2013) concluded that farm income, technological intensity and financial leverage influenced beef cattle producers' hedging decisions; while Silveira et al. (2014) showed that behavioural variables, farmer's education and crop size impacted the strategies adopted by coffee producers. Ullah et al. (2015) found evidence that farmers' characteristics such as age, education, risk aversion, risk perception, income and land ownership impacted the adoption of risk management tools among Pakistani farmers.
Finally, Woolverton and Sykuta (2009) examined the impact of income support programs on grain farmers' hedging decisions by comparing data from South Africa and the United States, two countries with very different agricultural policies. Results suggested that the South African farmers, operating within a non-supported agricultural marketing environment, tend to hedge a larger percentage of expected maize yields than U.S. farmers, who operate within a market price support environment.
Overall, several studies have found evidence that not only personal and business characteristics influence hedging decisions; producers' behaviour also plays an important role in the process.
Method

Analytical framework
Two theoretical perspectives were taken to understand farmers' marketing strategies (Working 1962; Garcia and Leuthold 2004) : (i) risk management and (ii) transaction costs. From the risk management perspective, it is hypothesised that citrus growers seek to maximise their expected utility, according to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) utility function. A specific marketing strategy is adopted when the expected utility of adoption exceeds the expected utility of non-adoption. The expected utility of adoption of forward contracts is positively influenced by grower's perception of risk reduction benefits provided by these contracts. In general, the parameters of this decision are not observed, but can be defined by a latent variable U ij that represents the expected utility of grower i associated with adoption of marketing strategy j. The expected utilities of adoption of spot market, shortterm forward contracts and long-term forward contracts are U i0 , U i1 and U i2 , respectively. For example, grower i can choose long-term forward contract if U i2 > U i1 and U i2 > U i0 (Goodwin and Schroeder 1994; Vergara et al. 2004) . The latent variable (U ij ) is a function of grower's and farm's characteristics (e.g. education, risk aversion, risk propensity, production size). It is assumed that these characteristics can influence growers' perception of the expected utility related to a marketing strategy, changing the grower's likelihood of choosing certain strategy.
In transaction costs perspective, there are rational economic reasons for the adoption of a type of marketing strategy. Asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency are the main dimensions that predict the contracting arrangements (Williamson 1981) . Adoption of forward contracts could be an efficient strategy for coordinating transactions between citrus growers and buyers, thus providing benefits, other than risk management. Desired quality attributes can be attained, opportunistic behaviour can be restrained, and risk of idle capacity can be reduced. Therefore, adoption of forward contracts can minimise transaction costs (Williams 1987) . From this perspective, forward contracts would be preferable to spot market 'if they do a better job of lowering transaction costs or coordinating agricultural production with the needs of the buyers' (Schieffer and Vassalos 2015) .
Econometric model
A multinomial logistic regression model was used to analyse factors determining the growers' decisions about the adoption of short-term and long-term forward contracts (Eqn 1). The dependent variable is based on three possible choices, where the choice parameter j is: 0 if the largest part of citrus production was sold in the cash market; 1 if the largest part of citrus production was sold through a short-term forward contract; and 2 if the largest part of citrus production was sold through long-term forward contract.
where the probability of adopting forward contracts (j = 1 for short-term contract and j = 2 for long-term contract) to sell the largest part of the crop relative to the spot market (base scenario) is a function of explanatory variables (X) and random errors (e). b is a vector of coefficients, which shows the impact of changes in the explanatory variables (X) on the probability of using forward contracts relative to the base scenario. The parameters of Equation (1) are estimated by maximum likelihood. Impacts of the explanatory variables are measured by their marginal effects, according to Equation (2). The effect of small changes (usually interpreted as unitary changes) in a specific X i variable on the likelihood of adoption of short-term or long-term forward contracts relative to spot market, ceteris paribus, is given by:
The elasticities of explanatory variables are also presented. The elasticities of continuous explanatory variables show the percentage change in the likelihood of adoption of short-term or long-term forward contracts for a 1 per cent of change in a specific X i variable. For the dummy variables, the elasticities (or semi-elasticities) can be interpreted as the percentage change in the likelihood of adoption of short-term or long-term forward contracts when X i variable changes from 0 to 1.
Data
A survey was designed to collect data by means of in-person interviews with citrus growers from the State of São Paulo, Brazil. The questionnaire comprised 83 questions on socioeconomic characteristics of growers and farms, including adoption of management tools and risk behaviour.
All farms were in the central, southern and northern regions of the citrus belt of the State of São Paulo (Appendix S1). The total number of citrus farms in these regions was 9,370, accounting for approximately 50 per cent of the regional production.
1 These regions are characterised by favourable climatic conditions for citrus production: annual temperature above 62.6°F and maximum water deficit of 60 mm per year (CIIAGRO 2013). The institutional environment, which also could affect the marketing strategies, is the same in all three regions. Therefore, the empirical analysis can focus on grower's personal and behavioural characteristics, as well as on farming and marketing aspects.
Simple random sampling was applied to select 98 growers. Using a 95 per cent confidence level with a sampling error of 10 per cent, 47 growers were in the southern region of the São Paulo citrus belt; 31 in the central and 20 in the northern. The data collection was carried out from March to September 2014, referring to the 2013/2014 crop year. During this period, the sampled farms produced around 2 per cent of production of the state in 9,441 ha.
Orange juice processing companies are the main buyers of oranges in the State of São Paulo. They adopt three main strategies in their transactions with growers: spot market, short-and long-term forward contracts. Other buyers, such as wholesalers and retailers, rely mainly on spot market. According to the survey data, 66 per cent of the growers adopted hedging strategies (forward contracts) in the 2013/2014 crop year: 49 growers adopted short-term forward contracts, and 16 growers adopted long-term forward contracts. The survey also revealed that 32 growers adopted the mixed strategy: selling most of their production using forward contracts, but also selling a minor portion in the spot market.
2 Short-term contracts establish the terms of transaction of the current crop production, while long-term contracts establish the terms for 2 years. Orange-processing firms negotiate forward contracts a few months before the harvest season. In general, these contracts have some standard clauses; long-term contracts usually present more terms. The price of ICE orange futures contract is usually adopted as a reference for a standard minimum price. A premium can also be adopted.
1 Approximately 75 per cent of Brazilian orange is produced in the State of São Paulo. From 2013 to 2016, the orange production in Brazil fluctuated between 15.98 and 17.5 million tons, which corresponds to around one-third of the world production (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics-IBGE 2016).
2 In 2013/2014 crop year, these 32 growers sold most of their citrus production using forward contracts. However, since their total orange production in this crop year was higher than the expected, they sell the surplus production in the spot market, which, in turn, represented, on average, 30 per cent of their total.
Both the minimum price and the premium are negotiated in advance. Price differentiation depends on volume, product quality and period of the year.
Variables and hypotheses
Explanatory variables may be summarised in three categories: growers' characteristics; farming and marketing aspects; and growers' behaviour and attitudes (Appendix S2). The first set includes three variables -age, education level and participation in grower pools. The level of formal education and the grower's age (as proxy for experience) are used to evaluate the role of human capital accumulation (Velandia et al. 2009) . Two hypotheses can be tested: growers with more experience/higher age adopt a more complex selling strategy such as forward contract (hypothesis 1); and growers with a higher level of education do the same (hypothesis 2).
The pools of orange growers in the State of São Paulo are mainly dedicated to orange selling and/or purchasing of inputs. Members are independent growers who join in a pool to discuss and plan joint strategies to sell oranges and purchase inputs. They are not necessarily members of any formal cooperative. Economies of scale and reduction in transaction costs are the most important incentives for participation. The cost of searching and screening potential buyers, along with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts, is reduced through pools. In addition, growers' contact with each other stimulates the sharing of information. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that growers who are members of pools have higher probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 3) (Pennings and Leuthold 2001) .
The second set of variables is based on five aspects of farming and marketing processes: size of the grove, farming concentration, technical assistance, adoption of management tools and selling to juice processing companies. Size was measured as the number of hectares of the grove. Nooteboom (1993) pointed out that small firms have higher transaction costs in designing and controlling the contracts, while Goodwin and Schroeder (1994) showed the positive effect of size on adoption of forward-pricing methods. Therefore, the hypothesis that citrus growers who own larger groves have higher probability of adopting a more complex price risk management strategy, such as forward contracts, was tested (hypothesis 4). However, farming concentration, in opposition to farming diversification, can be a risky production strategy. For this reason, growers who use this strategy would have higher probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 5). By diversifying the production, the farmers are already adopting a price risk management strategy, since it reduces the dependence of their total revenue in only one product (McNamara and Weiss 2005) . A Herfindahl concentration index was calculated and used as a proxy for farming concentration.
The role of management in the adoption of forward contracts was evaluated through two variables. The first one specifies if the grower received technical or managerial assistance from experts in the 2013/2014 crop year.
Growers receiving technical or managerial assistance have higher probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 6). The second variable is an index to measure adoption of seven management tools (Carrer et al. 2015) . The larger the number of adopted management tools, the higher the probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 7) (Vergara et al. 2004) . Assuming that growers who use management tools and technical assistance services have more information about marketing tools and actual market conditions, it is expected that they will most likely choose forward contracts. Mello and Paulillo (2009) found that citrus growers' sales to juice processing companies in Brazil are more likely to be coordinated through short-and long-term forward contracts, while sales to other channels (wholesalers, cooperatives, retailers, etc.) are usually coordinated through spot market. According to the authors, two characteristics of the transactions -frequency and asset specificity (Williamson 1981 ) -play a major role in marketing decisions in the Brazilian citrus industry. Juice processors seek stable supply of citrus to minimise idle capacity and meet clients demand for quality attributes. Negotiations with growers take into consideration the quality of the fruit (physical characteristics), along with location of the orchards and temporal aspects (the moment of the harvest). Contractual governance is assumed to be more efficient than the spot market to coordinate these transactions. Therefore, hypothesis 8 can be tested: growers who sell to juice processing firms are more likely to adopt forward contracts because this marketing tool can reduce transaction costs. A binary variable specifying if the grower sells to juice processing firms was included in the model to test this hypothesis.
Previous research showed evidence of the relevant role of behavioural attitudes on farmers' marketing decisions (Pennings and Leuthold 2000; Franken et al. 2012; Franken et al. 2014) . A third group of four variables was included in the model to test hypotheses on these subjects: risk perception, risk propensity, overconfidence in management and overconfidence in price. Growers were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement 'The citrus market is very risky'. They should choose from a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (5). Therefore, the variable 'risk perception' was obtained; the higher the score, the higher their risk perception. The same method was used to measure growers' risk propensity. In this case, the propensity to risk in the spot market was measured. Considering a hypothetical scenario of transactions in the spot market, growers provided their choice for the statement 'I trust in my intuition when I choose the best moment to sell oranges'. The variable 'risk propensity' was then obtained; the higher the score, the higher the propensity to take risk. Finally, the variable 'overconfidence in management' was obtained from the statement 'I manage my farm better than the average growers in my region'; stronger agreement with this statement indicates that the grower evaluates himself or herself more favourably than his or her average peer. These variables were used to test three hypotheses: growers with higher risk perception have higher probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 9), growers with higher propensity to take risk have lower probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 10), and growers who are more overconfident in their management have lower probability of adopting forward contracts (hypothesis 11).
Finally, 'overconfidence in price' is a binary variable that indicates if the grower is, or is not, overconfident in his or her forecast of orange prices. Overconfidence in price was measured by comparing the variance of market price with the variance of grower's subjective price. The first was calculated based on the market prices from 2000 to 2015 collected by Institute of Agricultural Economics (IEA 2015) for the State of Sao Paulo. The latter was calculated based on growers' perceptions of future prices. In the questionnaire, the grower provided his or her perception about the probabilities of seven ranges of orange prices 3 months into the future.
3 Each grower provided seven probability values, for which the summation should equal 100 per cent. The variance of the subjective price was then calculated for each grower. The grower was considered overconfident in price if the variance of his or her subjective price was lower than the variance of citrus market price. Therefore, a binary variable (1 -overconfident, 0 -otherwise) could be generated.
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables were estimated (Appendix S3). The mean age of the growers was 47 years, while the mean number of years of their formal schooling was 12. The mean size of their groves was 75.31 ha in the 2013/2014 crop year. In addition, 33 per cent of the growers participated in pools, 59 per cent sold oranges to juice processing firms, and 51 per cent received technical or managerial assistance in that period. The mean of the index for farming concentration was 0.60, with the minimum of 0.14 and maximum of 1. The mean of the index of adoption of management tools was 3.18 (the index ranges from 0 to 7). The behavioural variables showed that growers presented high risk perception (mean 4.63, in a range from 1 to 5), medium level of risk propensity (mean 2,74, in a range from 1 to 5) and medium to high level of overconfidence in management (mean 3.76, in a range 1-5), and 40 per cent of the growers showed overconfidence in price (Data S1).
It is important to note that the mean of 'risk perception' was quite high. This result reveals a structural characteristic of the citrus market in Brazilmore easily perceived during the crop year in which the interviews were conducted. The crop years of 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 were characterised by increasing incidence of pests and diseases in citrus groves, high volatility of citrus prices and instability in the trade relations between citrus growers and juice processing firms (IEA 2015) . Many growers left the industry during those years. Orange prices dropped dramatically during the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 crop years because of excess production in 2011/ 2012, exceptionally good weather conditions, high stocks of orange juice and decreasing world demand for it. Such scenario may have increased citrus growers' risk perception. Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients, marginal effects and elasticities for each of the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is a qualitative one, Y i, which represents the marketing decision adopted by the ith grower. Y i equals 0 if most of the crop was sold in the spot market; equals 1 if the grower i sold most of his or her production using short-term forward contracts; and equals 2 if most of the citrus production was marketed through long-term forward contract. Note ***Significance at 1%; **Significance at 5%; *Significance at 10%. ln(P 1 /P 0 ) represents the probability of using short-term forward contracts relative to spot market (base scenario); ln(P 2 /P 0 ) represents the probability of using long-term forward contracts relative to spot market (base scenario).
Results
The likelihood ratio (LR) test allows for rejection of the joint hypothesis, in which all coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero. In addition, Appendix S4 presents the correlation matrix for all independent variables, indicating that there is no multicollinearity problem among these variables. The Hausman and McFadden (HM) test was performed to investigate the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), indicating that IIA was not violated. 4 Consequently, the estimated model can be used to explain the factors that influence adoption of forward contracts.
Estimated coefficients, marginal effects and elasticities from the multinomial logit model reflect the effect of changes in explanatory variables on the probability of adopting short-term forward contracts or long-term forward contracts relative to spot market (base scenario). Results show that the probability of selecting short-term forward contracts over spot market is directly related to 'selling to processing' and 'management tools', and inversely related to 'farming concentration', 'risk propensity' and 'overconfidence in management'. The probability of selecting long-term forward contracts over spot market is directly related to participation in 'pools', 'technical or managerial assistance' and 'selling to processing', and inversely related to 'farming concentration' and 'risk propensity'.
Regression results shed more light on this analysis. They indicate that the juice processing companies' strategy of adopting forward contracts to enhance their supply predictability is tied to growers' demand for some hedging. This result is consistent with findings from the transaction costs perspective, agreeing with Mello and Paulillo (2009) and Schieffer and Vassalos (2015) . Given the higher demands on growers with respect to the regularity of supply and quality, the use of forward contracts seems to reduce transaction costs and better coordinate the transactions between growers and juice processing companies. Thus, the short-term and long-term forward contracts are more efficient than spot market to coordinate these transactions, which explains the parameters of variable 'selling to processing' on the estimated econometric model.
It is important to note that growers who sell to processing companies were free to choose the spot market as an alternative. The use of forward contract did not appear to be a condition imposed by processing companies, although contracts are more efficient in the coordination of these transactions. In fact, from the 58 growers who sold citrus fruit to juice processing companies, seven did not adopt forward contracts and 51 did adopt them (36 short-term and 15 long-term). Moreover, from the 40 citrus growers who did not sell to juice 4 The HM test is defined as:
Varðb f Þ are the estimated covariance matrices of restricted model and full model, respectively. Results from this study showed that ½ d
Varðb r Þ À d Varðb f Þ was not positive semidefinite. Hausman and McFadden (1984) and Cheng and Long (2007) processing companies, 15 adopted forward contracts (14 short-term and 1 long-term).
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In addition, the parameter for the variable 'risk propensity' was negatively and significantly related to the adoption of forward contracts, showing that the risk attitudes of growers also play a relevant role. Growers who agreed with the statement 'I trust in my intuition when I choose the best moment to sell oranges' have lower probability of adopting forward contracts. This result is an important empirical contribution of this study. The expected utility of the adoption of forward contracts is affected by the risk propensity of citrus growers. Growers with high (low) risk propensity are less (more) likely to adopt forward contracts. This result is consistent with the studies of Pennings and Leuthold (2000) , Vergara et al. (2004) , Franken et al. 2012 , Franken et al. (2014 and Silveira et al. (2014) . It also has implications for public and private strategies to disseminate the adoption of risk management tools. On the one hand, efforts towards diffusion among the less risk propensity growers are more effective and less costly. On the other hand, higher level of diffusion among risk propensity growers depends on strategies that affect the utility which they are able to perceive, such as information diffusion.
The parameter of the variable 'farming concentration' was found negatively and significantly related to the adoption of both short-term and long-term forward contracts. A high value of this explanatory variable indicates that production is more concentrated in one or few products. Consequently, growers who rely on one or few crops have lower probability to adopt long-and short-term forward contracts. This result contradicts the hypothesis, which states that crop concentration would increase the probability of adopting forward contracts. Adoption of forward contracts as an additional strategy for dealing with price risk is a plausible explanation. Growers who diversify production are more risk-averse and seek other strategies to minimise risks. Therefore, diversification and hedging can be considered complementary strategies to mitigate risk. This result is consistent with the thesis that by adopting one risk management tool, there is the probability of joint adoption of a second one (Ullah et al. 2015) .
The probability of adoption of short-term forward contracts as a hedging strategy is also related to the use of management tools, as shown by the positive and significant parameter of variable 'management tools'. Growers with a high level of management have greater probability of adopting hedging strategies. This result is in line with the study of Vergara et al. (2004) . However, growers who are overconfident in their management have lower probability of adoption, as shown by the negative and significant parameter of variable 'overconfidence in management'. This result is consistent with Silveira et al. (2014) who have explained that higher overconfidence in management may indicate excessive risk-taking and lower incentive to adopt more sophisticated risk management tools.
The adoption of long-term forward contracts was positively and significantly related to participation in pools, as shown by the parameter of the variable 'pool'. This finding is consistent with Mofokeng and Vink (2013) and Wolf (2012) . For them, cooperatives usually offer educational training programs and provide an environment that stimulates information exchange between members, which may influence on marketing strategies. In the case of the sampled citrus growers, the pools provide the necessary scale to negotiate better terms in long-term forward contracts and reduce the transaction costs in the grower-buyer relationship. The adoption of this kind of contract is also positively and significantly associated with technical or managerial assistance from experts, public extension service or private consultants, as shown by the parameter of the variable 'technical or managerial assistance'. This is an external source of information on marketing tools, which can motivate the adoption of forward contracts. Table 3 summarises the hypotheses and the results of the econometric model. There is no evidence that age, education, crop size, risk perception and overconfidence in price do influence the adoption of forward contracts. This finding contradicts recent findings for farmers' age, educational level and crop size (Mofokeng and Vink 2013; Franken et al. 2014; Ullah et al. 2015) .
Conclusions
A survey of citrus growers of the State of São Paulo, Brazil, provided information to evaluate determinants of citrus growers' hedging decisions. Two theoretical perspectives, transaction costs and risk management, provided important insights into the issue. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that evaluates the determinants of marketing choices made by citrus growers. Face-to-face interviews were carried out in 2014 to collect data from 98 citrus growers from the most important citrus-producing area in the world.
The results of a multinomial logit model suggested that farming and marketing characteristics play the most important role in hedging decisions. All explanatory variables of this group, except for crop size, have a significant influence on citrus growers' hedging choices. The probability of adopting forward contracts over spot market is directly related to the use of technical assistance, the adoption of management tools and the decision to sell to juice processing companies, confirming hypotheses 6, 7 and 8. However, the adoption of forward contracts is inversely related to farm concentration, refuting hypothesis 5.
Growers who seek information from professional expertise and possess a high level of management are more likely to adopt forward contracts. The study also revealed complementarity between the diversification of production and the use of forward contracts. Growers who already adopt some hedging strategy are more likely to adopt others. These results highlight that the expected utility from the adoption of hedge tools is positively influenced by the access and sharing of information and by the adoption of other management tools and techniques. Suppliers of these tools should consider this positive perception on complementarities, and tailor-made packages could be developed. In addition, citrus growers who sell to juice processing companies are more likely to adopt short-term and long-term forward contracts because both transaction costs and risks are reduced when they do so. In other words, the growers' choice to use contracting also represents a way of managing the grower-buyer relationship and coordinating the activity.
Behavioural variables also play a relevant role in marketing choices, confirming hypotheses 10 and 11. Growers who were overconfident in management were less inclined to use short-term forward contracts, while growers with higher risk propensity tend to adopt short-term and longterm forward contracts. However, the effect of two variables of this group, 'overconfidence in prices' and 'risk perception', was not significant.
'Participation in pools' has a significant influence on the probability of using long-term forward contracts relative to spot market (base scenario), confirming hypothesis 3. Participation in pools provides economies of scale and reduction in transaction costs in negotiations involving forward contracts. Results suggest that human capital accumulation (represented by age and years of formal education) did not affect the marketing choices.
This research provides new insights into citrus growers marketing strategies and contributes to the ongoing concern regarding factors that affect farmers' marketing strategies to reduce risks. Moreover, it highlights the importance of considering farmers' behaviour and attitudes towards risk when designing policies and strategies to disseminate the adoption of hedge management tools. Brazilian commercial banks, for instance, often employ questionnaires to better understand their customers' attitudes towards risk. Portfolios of financial products are proposed to customers according to his or her behavioural evaluation. Public and private organisations devoted to the diffusion of hedge tools should consider the behavioural characteristics of farmers in their choice of strategies. This can significantly increase effectivity.
